

Y-UNIX
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AUTHOR

Unix Software Licensing Issues

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UNIX SOFTWARE LICENSING ISSUES

PREPARED FOR
BELL LABS

MARCH 30, 1983

INPUT

CURRENT SITUATION

- o License to
 - Computer vendors (e.g., IBM, Fortune)
 - Software houses (e.g., Microsoft, Unisoft)
- o Problems
 - Too many potential licensees for economical marketing, support and validation.
 - Small licensee problem:
 - Consume disproportionate amounts of Bell Lab resources and expect fast response
 - Possible legal problems in denying license status to any vendor, especially if denial based on size.

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CURRENT ROYALTY APPROACH

- o Under current licensing, unit royalties increase in proportion to the number of users of a target system, and are discounted based on cumulative royalty payment volume. (See Exhibit A).
- o Two current licensees have attained the \$1 million discount level and perhaps 3 are in the upper region of the under \$1 million level.
- o When the current pricing discount schedule was introduced in November 1981, licensees of the older Version 7 were not permitted to carry forward their cumulative dollar volume credits: All vendors, old and new, were "set back to zero".
- o Royalties from Non-UNIX products (e.g., "C" language licensing) are credited toward dollar volumes.
- o Current schedule assumes relatively modest sales levels. (Exhibit B)

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EXHIBIT A

CURRENT UNIX SUBLICENSING ROYALTIES (PER UNIT)

CUMULATIVE ROYALTY PAYMENTS (\$MILL.)

<u>NUMBER OF USERS IN TARGET SYSTEM</u>	<u>UNDER \$1.0</u>	<u>\$1.0-2.5</u>	<u>OVER \$2.5</u>
1*	\$ 100	\$ 70	\$ 40
2-16*	\$ 250	\$125	\$ 50
17-33	\$ 750	\$500	\$250
34-64	\$3,500	-----	-----
64 +	\$7,000	-----	-----

*MICROCOMPUTER CATEGORIES: Primary focus of this study.

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EXHIBIT B

UNITS SOLD AT CURRENT PRICING

	BREAKPOINTS		
	<u>UNDER \$1.0 MILL</u>	<u>\$1.0 - 2.5 MILL</u>	<u>OVER \$2.5 MILL</u>
Weighted royalty per unit	\$130	\$60	\$42
Units Sold (000)			
- Within breakpoint	\$ 7.5	\$25	\$59*
- Cumulative	\$ 7.5	\$32.5	\$91.5*

*at \$5 million in royalties

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PLANS

- o Goal: "pervasiveness"
- o Principal approach: License UNIX to microprocessor manufacturers
 - Microprocessors are growth area/battleground
 - Discussions with Motorola, Intel, National Semi
- o Licensing to microprocessor manufacturers would bypass many of the problems associated with current licensing focus (computer and software vendors).
- o Potential advantages: volume, standarization and competitive positioning vis-a-vis competitive operating systems.
- o Intel is key target.

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INTEL: KEY TARGET

CHIP TYPE	UNIX UNIT SALES 1984 + 1985 (000)		INCREMENT FROM COOPERATION AT PENETRATION OF:	
	NO CHIP MFR COOPERATION	10%	25%	
INTEL	180	460	1,150	
MOTOROLA	496	50	125	
TOTAL	676	510	1,275	

SOURCE: Bell Labs

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PRICING ISSUE

- o Bell Labs wishes to make a wide-scale offering of UNIX by microprocessor manufacturers as attractive as possible.
- o To start microprocessor manufacturers on the bottom of the present discount scale would make them initially uncompetitive with current vendors.
- o To "set back to zero" twice in two years would shake the confidence in all vendors in Bell Labs as reliable supplier (i.e., licensees being able to make medium-term assumptions that Bell Lab prices would not be arbitrarily increased).
- o Dollar volumes from other products would no longer be created for UNIX discount purposes.
- o Future growth of microcomputer market will swamp pre-1983 UNIX royalty revenues.

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UNIX ROYALTY GROWTH (\$ MILL)

Pre-1983	\$ 10 (approx.)
1983	6
1984-86	<u>70</u>
TOTAL	\$ 86

SOURCE: Bell Labs

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OPTIONS

- o No change.
- o "Reset to zero" - no price changes.
- o Reset to zero - reduce microcomputer prices.
- o Reduce microcomputer per unit prices (no reset to zero).
- o Add one or more dollar volume discount categories.
- o Based discount dollar volumes on a specific time period (e.g., one year), rather than be cumulative.
- o Allow dollar volumes to be far contracted (i.e., future) volumes rather than actual (i.e., past) volumes.

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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
(UNDERLINING = CRITICAL ISSUE)

OPTION	POSITIVE EFFECTS	NEGATIVE EFFECTS
No Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Keeps business relationships stable between Bell Labs and licensees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <u>Discourages new entrants</u>
Reset clock to zero- no price change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Places new entrants on same footing as current licensees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Destabilizes current licensees business environment o <u>Discourages long-term business planning of UNIX use</u>
Reset to zero- reduce prices	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Places new entrants on same footing as current licensees o Current licensees' royalties about the same (depending on amount of reduction) o Encourage rapid volume build-up by new entrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Somewhat destabilizing, especially to those about to "graduate" to a better discount category o <u>May encourage more small licensees</u> o May initially reduce revenue to Bell Labs

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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
(UNDERLINING = CRITICAL ISSUE) - CONT'D.

OPTION	POSITIVE EFFECTS	NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Contractual Dollar Volumes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o New entrants can qualify for <u>lowest royalty immediately</u> o Tie Bell Labs and licensees closer together o Places new entrants and current licensees on similar footing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Risk to licensee

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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS
(UNDERLINING = CRITICAL ISSUE) - CONT'D.

OPTION	POSITIVE EFFECTS	NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Reduce prices (no reset to zero)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Keeps business relationship stable between Bell Labs and licensees o Incentive to current licensees o Absolute incentive to new entrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <u>New entrants remain at relative disadvantage</u>
Add more Dollar Volume Categories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Increases volume incentive o <u>Disincentive to build UNIX look-alike</u> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <u>No immediate benefits to licensee</u>
Time Period Discounts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Future-oriented, to a degree o Places new entrants and current licensees on same footing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Current licensees have a defacto advantage (current momentum)

LESSONS FROM THE HARDWARE MARKETPLACE

- o Similarities of display terminals and microcomputer operating systems
 - Large volumes
 - Products integrated into overall system
 - Manufacturers/OEMs are main market
 - Competitor compatibility (3270 - compatible, UNIX - compatible)
- o Display discount structure:
 - Steep discount curves
 - Dollar volumes based on specific time periods (usually one year)
 - Discounts based on contracted volumes
 - Discount usually lost if volumes not made
- o Dissimilarities
 - Rate of product obsolescence
 - Marginal manufacturing costs

RECOMMENDATIONS

- o Retain existing per unit discount structure; lower break points to compensate for no longer including non-UNIX products.
 - Will reduce apparent change, reassure current customer on stability of Bell Lab agreements
 - Implicitly discourage small vendors
- o Add more discount breakpoints
 - Encourage new entrants (who will presumably contemplate high volumes)
 - Negotiate royalties over \$10 million to discourage in-house development or acquisition of UNIX look-alike
 - See Exhibit C
- o Allow discount volumes to be calculated on either cumulative dollar volumes or on contractual dollar volumes.
 - Microprocessor vendors will be able to obtain immediate discount benefits (See Exhibit D & E)
 - They will have incentives to reach high volumes
 - They will be tied closer to UNIX
 - Current vendors will not be penalized
 - Discount incentives will be offered for both current and prospective customer bases

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EXHIBIT C

PROPOSED SUBLICENSING ROYALTIES (PER UNIT)

TARGET SYSTEM USERS	BREAKPOINTS (CUMULATIVE ROYALTIES - UNIX ONLY) \$MILL.						
	UNDER \$1.0	\$1 - 2	\$2 - 3	\$3 - 4	\$4 - 5	\$5 - 10	OVER \$10
1	\$ 100	\$ 70	\$ 40	\$ 30	\$ 20	\$ 10	*
2-16	\$ 250	\$125	\$ 50	\$ 40	\$ 25	\$ 12	*
17-33	\$ 750	\$500	\$250	\$200	\$150	\$100	*
34-64	\$3,500	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
over 64	\$7,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

*Negotiable

INPUT

EXHIBIT D

UNITS SOLD AT PROPOSED DOLLAR DISCOUNT PRICING

	UNDER \$1.0 MILL	BREAKPOINTS (CUMULATIVE ROYALTIES)					OVER 10 MILL
		\$1-2 MILL	\$2-3 MILL	\$3-4 MILL	\$4-5 MILL	\$5-10 MILL	

Weighted Royalty
per unit

\$130 \$60 \$42 \$32 \$21 \$10 *

Units Sold (000)

- Within breakpoint	8	17	23	31	48	500
- Cumulative	8	25	48	79	127	627

*Negotiable

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EXHIBIT E

DISCOUNT SCHEDULE FOR
CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (OVER TWO YEARS)

<u>UNITS SOLD (000)</u>	<u>DISCOUNT FROM CUMULATIVE PRICE</u>
Up to 25	15%
Up to 50	25%
Up to 100	30%
Up to 250	40%
Up to 500	50%
over 500	negotiable

- o Steep curve aimed at largest potential licensees.

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RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D)

- o Contracted dollar volumes should initially be for a period greater than one year.
 - Display experience is not analogous since obsolescence is much less of a factor in operating systems software
 - Five years is probably too long since the microcomputer marketplace is changed quickly
 - A two year period will allow new entrants to build products and volume
- o Announce that cumulative credits will be replaced by credits for specific time periods when annual shipment data is more stable.
 - Interim incentive to increase sales
 - Will make pricing policy more flexible and responsive
 - Give sufficient lead time will allow licensees to plan

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RISKS

- o Licensees with considerable non-UNIX royalties will find that their progress is slower, even through the new, closer break points.
- o Small volume licensees may see themselves at a competitive disadvantage
 - This may be a legal issue
 - Since marginal costs are very small, almost any discount structure is defensible
- o Any pricing structure can be raided by look-alikes
 - Their marginal costs are also very low
 - Closely related to value of UNIX name
- o In-house development of look-alike much lower risk (see next page)

IN-HOUSE DEVELOPMENT OF LOOK-ALIKE

- o Assumptions
 - Cost: Between \$2-10 million
 - Time: At least one year
 - Risk: Considerable
- o Market value: Unknown, but less than UNIX
- o Conclusions
 - Acquisition of already-developed look-alike is much more likely than in-house development

CRITICAL ISSUE: MONETARY VALUE OF UNIX NAME

- o Main threat is undercutting by a look-alike, offering
 - A product said to be as good or better
 - A significant discount
- o Look-alikes lack luster sales are a significant incentive
- o How big does price gap have to be to affect UNIX?
 - From software developers/OEMS standpoint?
 - From end users standpoint?
- o What market research is available?

SUMMARY OF ADVANTAGES

- o General change of environment for current licensees.
- o Allows current licensees a discount growth path.
- o Gives new entrants incentives at least as strong as current licensees.
- o Introduces a forward-looking incentive.
- o Ties large licensees closer to Bell Labs.

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